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This study examines whether the changes in the financial statements
and dividends can together provide a better information transmittal system
to deliver missing private information on the firm using Indonesian firms
as the sample. In doing so, this study consider three components in
evaluating the dividend signaling theory: the expected content favorable-
ness, the sign of dividend change, and the role of dividend signal. The
finding shows that in Indonesia, the market reactions to the dividend
announcements depend on the role of dividend signals, whether it is
confirmatory, clarificatory, or unclear. The other finding shows that this
market is more concern to the content expected favorableness rather than
to the dividend sign.
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Introduction
The finance and economic literature
about dividends usually assumes that man-
agers are perfect agents of investors. Econo-
mists find dividend mysterious. The cel-
ebrated articles by Merton Miller and
Franco Modigliani declared them irrelevant
because investors could home-brew their
own dividends by selling from or borrow-
ing against their portfolios. Meanwhile the
firms that issued the dividends would also
incur costs to float new securities to main-
tain their optimal investment policies. Divi-
dend is hard enough to be explained. In the
stock market, a company should set its
dividend policy, which involves the deci-
sion to pay out earnings versus retaining
them for reinvestment in the firm. Basi-
cally, the firm’s value is influenced by
owner’s equity and debt. In the stock price
model that has constant growth, a higher
dividend payment tends to increase the
stock price. The increase in the stock price
means the increase in the firm’s value.
However, the higher dividend payout ratio
the lower the company’s ability in invest-
ment as well as the company’s growth,
which finally may cause the stock price
decreases because investors do react to the
dividend change announcements. There-
fore, in an attempt to maximizing the
shareholder’s wealth, it is important to
consider the relationship between divi-
dend and the firm’s value.
Brigham (1999, p.47) note that divi-
dend changes can provide signals about
managers’ beliefs as to their firms’ future
prospects. Dividend reductions generally
have a significant effect on a firm’s stock
price. Since managers recognize this, they
try to set dollar dividends low enough so
that there is only a remote chance that
dividend will have to be reduced in the
future. Of course, unexpectedly large divi-
dend increases can be used to provide
positive signals.
Asymmetric information will lead to
the market reaction. Managers in general
have better information than outside in-
vestors. Elfakhani (1995) stated that the
information is valuable if the investments
in place or opportunities to invest can have
positive effect in the firm’s future cash
flows, and in this circumstance, managers
must use expensive, and credible, divi-
dends to communicate this private infor-
mation to the market.
The signaling system explained by
Elfakhani (1995), involves three corpo-
rate attributes: capital investment, financ-
ing and agency decisions, all of which
contribute to the firm’s future cash flows.
Moreover, he noted that most of studies
about dividend signaling theory not fo-
cused on all of those three attributes. Fur-
thermore, the events of preceding divi-
dend changes also ignored. In fact, Aharony
and Swary (1980) found that these events
might reflect on the magnitude and direc-
tion of stock price response to dividend
announcement.
The main process of signaling sys-
tem used in this paper is that the three
corporate attributes above are transmitted
to the market in two phases. The first is
through financial statement, which is the
mandatory one. The second is through the
discretion to announce a dividend change
as signaling means. In the first phase,
investors may evaluate the financial state-
ment for its favorableness and its clarity of
its three corporate attributes, whether it is
clear or unclear. In the second phase, the
dividend signals can confirm good, bad or
flat news already observed in the phase
one. Or, it can clarify the ambiguous part
in the phase one; so that, the information
becomes clearly good, clearly bad, still
ambiguous, or remains flat. The other pos-
sibility is the information contained in the
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dividend announcement can be unclear,
and therefore has less significant explana-
tory power.
The examination of signaling pro-
cess in this paper employed the research
method done by Elfakhani (1995), where
the stock price response to dividend signal
is jointly determined by three factors: the
expected content favorableness from the
dividend signal, the sign of dividend
change, and the dividend signaling role.
In other words, this research mainly
takes the same approach or a replication
research of the Elfakani (1995) using the
information from the Jakarta Stock Ex-
change. The main research purpose is to
examine whether the same conclusion
could be drawn and whether there is infor-
mation contents on dividend of public firm
in Indonesia. In short, the transmittal pro-
cess and dividend signal will be examined
to investigate the role of dividend change,
and expected content of favorableness.
Literature Review
Much research about dividend an-
nouncement have been done, such as
Char4est (1978); Lang and Litzenberger
(1989); Penman (1983); Watts (1973);
Pettit (1976); and Aharony (1980). Gener-
ally, the result showed that the dividend
increases or dividend decrease can give
significant effects on the share price.
The irrelevance of dividend policy to
firm valuation observed by Miller and
Modigliani (1961) continues to challenge
both theorists and practitioners. In gen-
eral, firms maintain target dividend payouts
over time and investors receive cash divi-
dends and do react to dividend change
announcements. Therefore, for wealth
maximisers, knowledge of how dividend
relates to the value of the firm is a non-
trivial issue (Elfakhani 1995). According
to Kale and Noe (1990), many theories
concerning the value of dividends expand
on the role of dividend as a signal of firm
quality. While these models elaborate on
the original signaling idea in Miller and
Modigliani (1961), they retain the notion
that the dividends convey the information
concerning the level of current or future
economic profits.
The signaling hypothesis holds that
firms use dividends to signal asymmetric
information, which induces a reassess-
ment of the firm’s expected future earn-
ings and a simultaneous adjustment of
share price (Manakyan and Carroll 1990).
Several studies, such as John and Will-
iams (1985), Miller and Rock (1985) ex-
amine theoretically the mechanisms by
which dividends can serve as signals.
Another outright empirical research,
e.g.  Aharony and Swary (1980), Dyle and
Weigand (1998), Manakyan and Carroll
(1990), focused on the link between the
signal and the market’s reassessment of
the stock prices movement. In general,
evidence is consistent with the use of divi-
dends as signals in that the market reacts
positively to dividend increases and nega-
tively to dividends cuts.
Ross (1977) and Battacharya (1979)
integrated the information content hypoth-
esis with the signaling theory. They dem-
onstrate that dividends provide informa-
tion about the firm’s future cash flow and
thus the dividend decision can changes a
firm’s value. Their hypothesis assumes
that managers possess private information
about the firm’s attributes not known to
the market. This information is valuable if
the investments in place or opportunities
to invest can have positive effect on the
firm’s future cash flows. In this circum-
stance, managers must use expensive, and
credible, dividends to communicate this
private information to the market,
(Elfakhani 1995).
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In addition, he proposed that in a
world of asymmetric information, three
corporate attributes —capital investment,
capital structure, and agency— is trans-
mitted to the market in the financial state-
ments and dividend announcement. The
financial statement published by firms lead-
ing the investors to the revealed earnings
figures. Therefore the performance of the
firms can be evaluated from its financial
statement, in the case that the earnings
announcement leads the dividend an-
nouncement, before evaluating the infor-
mation content in the dividend. Nonethe-
less, investors are more interested in the
financial statements with the details lead-
ing to the revealed earnings figures,
Swaminathan and Weintrop (1991). Us-
ing the information contained in the bal-
ance sheet, the investors can infer the
meaning and direction of the firm’s at-
tributes. The dividend announcement car-
ried out after the earnings announcement
can confirm the market understanding of
already released information, Elfakhani
(1995). Moreover, the evidence in the re-
search conducted by Manakyan and Caroll
(1990) indicated that the combined influ-
ence of the lagged dividends on earnings is
not significant, while the combined influ-
ence of lagged earnings in dividends is
significant. Thus, in aggregate, direction
of causality is from earnings to dividends.
Discussing the earnings and the divi-
dend announcements, there are separate
effects of earnings as part of balance sheet
and dividend announcements on abnor-
mal returns to equity, Easton (1991). Kane,
Lee and Marcus (1984) argued that, in
view of the noise associated with both
earnings and dividend announcements,
investors might be interested in the consis-
tency of these signals. They found evi-
dence of an interaction effect of earnings
and dividend announcements on abnor-
mal returns to equity.
The Signaling Mechanism of
Balance Sheet and Dividend
Announcements
The investments and financing deci-
sions are made at the management’s dis-
cretion. Knowing the investors’ perception,
managers use the release of earnings an-
nouncements to validate some of their
verbal declarations (Kane et al. 1984).
Nonetheless, investors are more interested
in the financial statements with the details
leading to the revealed earnings figures
(Swaminathan and Weintrop 1991). Fi-
nancial statements can be subject to
manipulation. However, informed inves-
tors can still use it to estimate the value of
the firm’s attributes. Thus, the release of
balance sheet constitutes the first phase of
the information transmittal process.
As stated by Elfakhani (1995), in the
first phase, outsiders use balance sheet
changes to infer the meaning and direction
of the firm’s attributes. These changes can
mean good, bad or flat news. As informa-
tion content of balance sheet is quite clear
with little uncertainty, in the second phase,
the discretion in the dividend changes can
only confirm market understanding to the
information content of balance sheet al-
ready released. In short, dividend changes
have no signals about future activities. In
the other condition, if information content
of balance sheet in the first phase does not
improve certainty about the meaning and
direction of released information, then in
the second phase, dividend change signals
can be valuable if it provides clear infor-
mation about the firm’s future success. If
the dividend signal fails to clear uncer-
tainty or is not efficient, then this signal is
unclear. The conjecture is that a confirma-
tory signal is expected to cause little posi-
tive market response to good news and
small negative response to bad news.
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Clarificatory signals bring strong positive
(negative) market reaction to good  (bad)
news. Unclear signals usually do not elimi-
nate all uncertainies surrounding conflict-
ing news. Thus, they provoke lesser mar-
ket movements than clarificatory signals.
Thus, the three types of dividend signaling
role rank from most to least valuable. A
clarificatory signal has the highest value
and a confirmatory signal has the lowest
value.
The transmittal process will be ex-
amined in order to investigate the validity
of the testing methodology in interpreting
the dividend signal by its role, dividend
change, and expected content of favor-
ableness. The testable contention is that
this process can contribute a better assess-
ment of the dividend signal and the firm’s
value.
Variable Description
Variables used in evaluating the
changes component of balance sheet and
dividend are: cash (C), investment (I),
common stocks (CS), retained earnings
(RE), bond (B) and dividends (D). Those
variables can be defined as follow:
a. C is defined as all current assets except
inventory.
b. I is set as all net fixed assets plus inven-
tory.
c. B includes short and long term liabili-
ties.
d. CS combines common stocks and paid-
in-capital.
e. D is defined as cash dividend.
Changes exceeding 5 percent for C, I,
B, and RE are classified as >0; these for RE
are as <0; otherwise they are included in
the no change (-0) category. This filter is
used to account for classification error and
to capture only significant changes. Fol-
lowing Kalay and Lowenstein (1985), divi-
dend omissions are recorded as regular
decreases in dividends. Newly initiated
dividends are treated as increases in divi-
dends.
Sample Selection
The sample of this study consists of
240 public companies, which give cash
dividend and have the same fiscal-years
end (December). Financial institutions are
discarded because they have different con-
ditions and policies with manufacturing
companies; the remaining sample is 202
companies. The firms reporting negative
earnings for two years are dismissed, so
the number of companies reduce to 199
companies. The companies in this sample
also should release the financial statement
before announcing the dividend. There-
fore, the firms that announce dividend
within 45 days after the financial state-
ment release are admitted in the sample,
otherwise they are dropped.
The number of companies announces
dividend after the financial release is 194
companies. Those final sample fall into
two group, 52 companies announce divi-
dend within 45 days and 142 companies
announce dividend more than 45 days
after the financial statement released. To
control the impact of other variables, com-
panies having stock split, acquisition, or
merger, stock dividend and bonus shares
are excluded from the sampling frame.
This research does not make separate analy-
sis of each group and it will be done for
another research.
Analysis Method
Evaluating the Dividend Signal
As stated before, investors evaluate
the signaling mechanisms by considering
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three components. They are expected con-
tent favorableness from dividend signal
(flat, good, bad, or ambiguous); the sign of
dividend change (+ or -); and the role of
dividend signal (confirmatory,
clarifycatory or unclear). The sign of divi-
dend change reflects size and strength of
the expected market reaction. This in turn
depends on the role of the signal.
The three role of dividend towards
the information content brought in the
balance sheet announcements before the
dividend announcements are defined as
follows:
a. Confirmatory: confirmatory signal oc-
curs if a single attribute can project one
value about the revealed attribute both
before and after the dividend announce-
ment. If the market interpretation of
balance sheet changes reflecting the
firm’s attributes is simple and straight-
forward, a consensus firm value can
then be reached. In this case, reassured
investors react based on their apprecia-
tion of the revealed attribute.
b. Clarificatory: clarificatory signal oc-
curs if balance sheet changes include
more than one attribute and may carry
conflicting news (simultaneous posi-
tive and negative news). In this case,
the interpretation of balance sheet in-
formation is less clear, and the dividend
announced can clarify one of the possi-
bilities of conflicting news from bal-
ance sheet items.
c. Unclear: this signal does not carry any
clear explanation even for conflicting
news. The dividend announced also
cannot make the information of changes
in balance sheet items clearer. This
unclear role does not mean that the
dividend signal has a zero value; in-
stead it is expected to have a net good or
net bad effect on the stock price. This
signal would not have the same value as
a clarificatory signal.
So, in this classification, all sample
will be divided into several group based on
its expected favorableness, its dividend
sign, and its signaling role. The objective
of this classification is to test the hypoth-
eses in each group as well as in group
combinations.
Table 1. The Exemplified Role of Dividend Signal
Phase one: Balance sheet Phase two: Dividend Signaling Evaluation
Announcement Announcement
News Attribute Expected Attribute Signaling Expected Market
Favorableness Clarity Favorableness  Clarity  Role  Response
Flat Clear Flat Clear Confirmatory No Reaction
Potentially Good Clear Good Clear Confirmatory Low/Med Positive
Potentially Bad Clear Bad Clear Confirmatory Low/Med Negative
Ambiguous Unclear Good or Bad Clear Clarificatory Med/Hi Pos./Negative
Ambiguous Unclear Ambiguous Unclear Unclear Low/Med Net
Pos./Negative
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Event study Method
a. To calculate the actual return of
shares, the following equation is used:
Rit = ln (Pit / Pit-1)                    (1)
b. The share’s abnormal return, the
difference between observed return of se-
curity i and the expected return, as well as
the expected return within 60 days are
calculated using the following equation:
ARit = Rit - E(Rit) (2)
E(Rit) = ai - biRmt - eit (3)
R
mt = ln(IHSGt / IHSGt-1) (4)
c. The daily abnormal return above
are then averaged across the portfolio of
firms or all securities which increase, de-
crease or do not change their dividend
level as follows:
t+5 n




 is the mean abnormal return,
which is calculated by forming an equally
weighted of all individual abnormal re-
turns for each event day (n).
To test for significance of the impact
of the event during period, the abnormal
return can be added to obtain the cumu-
lative abnormal return (CAR) for the indi-
vidual security over the period. The cumu-
lative abnormal returns are calculated over
the entire event period of the group by
dividing this event period into three parts:
pre-announcement (t-4 to t-1), an-
nouncement (0 to t+1), and post announce-
ment (t+2 to t+5) using the following
equation:
l
CAR  =      ARk                        (6)
k
where k and l are the starting and last day
of each part (for example, k=t-4 ad l= t-1
for pre-announcement).
Hypotheses
The uncertainty about the firm’s state
can be resolved after the balance sheet
announcement. Alternatively, this may
have to wait the dividend announcement
or alternative signals. The common knowl-
edge in the recent dividend literature is
that dividend announcement contains valu-
able information not known to the market
(Bhattacharya 1979; Miller and Rock 1985;
and Charest 1978). Therefore the first hy-
pothesis explains the effect of dividend
signaling role on stock prices toward bal-
ance sheet information, which is released
before the dividend announcement. The
first hypothesis is formulated as follows:
H1 : The dividend signal (confirmatory,
clarificatory, or unclear) affects share
price following the dividend an-
nouncement.
The dividend signaling models sug-
gest that managers increase dividends only
when they are confident that higher divi-
dends can be maintained with higher sub-
sequent cash flow.  Evidence from previ-
ous research is consistent with the use of
dividends as signals in that the market
reacts positively to dividend increases and
negatively to dividend cuts (John and Wil-
liam 1985, Watts 1973; and Lang and
Litzenberger 1989). Thus, the second hy-
pothesis is used to examine the relation-
ship between sign of dividend change and
stock price behavior. The second hypoth-
esis is stated as follows:
H2 : Dividend change (increase, decrease,
or flat) affects share price following
the dividend announcement.
Since the confirmatory and unclear
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than clarificatory signals to minimize prob-
lem arises, then the next hypotheses inves-
tigate the case of clarificatory signals com-
bined with the sign and the content of
favorableness of the dividend. This last
hypothesis is inline with Swaminathan
and Weintrop (1991); Elfakani (1995) and
Asquisth and Mullins (1983).  The third
hypothesis is formulated as follows:
H3:  Clarificatory signal conditioned on
the sign of dividend change (increase,
decrease or flat) and the content fa-
vorableness (good or bad) affects
share price following the dividend
announcement.
Results
The results of the test for Hypothesis-
1 is shown in Table 2. The table covers
three parts of test period: pre-announce-
ment period (-4 to -1), announcement pe-
riod (0,+1), and post announcement pe-
riod (+1 to +5).
The probability of the outcome is
shown in parentheses under the cumula-
tive abnormal return (CAR). Evaluating
Table 2, it is revealed that among the three
types of dividend signaling role, the
clarificatory signal has the highest market
response. From the significance level, the
clarificatory signal is the only one that has
significant number on the announcement
date and post announcement date at the
0.031 and 0.032 levels, whereas totally it
is significant at the 0.004 levels. The other
two signals, confirmatory and unclear sig-
nal, have no significant result. It means
that these two signals do not add to what
the market already knows from other mana-
gerial decisions. The conclusion can be
drawn from here is if the dividend signal
can improve the clarity of the firm’s con-
dition, then the market reaction becomes
stronger.
Table 3 shows the results of Hypoth-
esis-2 testing on the impact of dividend
change on stock prices. From the signifi-
cance number, all dividend changes are
statistically significant on the post an-
nouncement and on the total test period.
The dividends with positive sign bring
positive market reactions. It is quite clear
that most of the dividend increase bring
good news to the market. To the next sign,
the stable dividend, the market reactions
show negative number of average abnor-
mal returns. This can be explained that the
stable dividend in this sample indicates
more bad news than good news. This kind
Table 2. CAR Results for Dividend Signal Hypothesis-1
Hypothesis-1 examines the three roles of dividend signaling: confirmatory, clarificatory,
and unclear. The numbers in parentheses are p-values. The sample period is 1998-2000.
Signaling Role Pre-Announcement Announcement Post-Announcement Total
(-4 to -1) (0 to +1)  (+2 to +5)  (-4 to +5)
Confirmatory 0.006932877 -0.016793889 0.025693256 0.015832243
(0.913) (0.389) (0.212) (0.754)
Clarificatory 0.025590618 0.014975276 0.08105197 0.121617864
(0.242) (0.031)* (0.032)* (0.004)*
Unclear 0.005076588 -0.015788846 0.022306427 0.011594168
(0.936) (0.321) (0.112) (0.976)
* Significant at .05 levels
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Table 3. CAR results for Dividend Signal Hypothesis-2
Hypothesis-2 examines the effect of dividend change on stock returns. Dividend can
increase (+), remain stable (0), or decrease (-). The numbers in parentheses are p-
values. The sample period is 1998-2000.
Dividend Pre-Announcement Announcement Post-Announcement Total
Change  (-4 to -1) (0 to +1) (+2 to +5) (-4 to +5)
(+) 0.020668881 -0.00376756 0.027581235 0.044482556
(0.169) (0.352) (0.013)* (0.021)*
(O) -0.004577925 -0.001544969 -0.001868886 -0.007991781
(0.135) (0.429) (0.079)** (0.012)*
(-) 0.013386566 0.019928982 0.15526672 0.188582269
(0.551) (0.614) (0.078)** (0.047)*
* significant at .05 level; ** significant at .10 level
of situation is also happened at the divi-
dend decreases, which brought positive
reaction. With the same analysis, it may
give indication that dividend decrease in
this sample reveals more good news rather
than bad news. It is important to be noted
here that in fact, the dividend decrease
does not always bring negative reaction.
This result will be clearer when evaluating
the later hypothesis.
Table 4 reports that clarificatory sig-
nals can significantly induce all of the
dividend change, whether it is increases,
flat or decreases on the post announce-
ment period and on the total test period
(Hypothesis III, Panel A).
 In Panel B, the dividend having good
news has stock price adjustment after the
announcement day, but clarificatory sig-
nal that bring both good and bad news
induce significantly positive or negative
overall stock price adjustments. Panel C
reports that signals bringing good news is
consistently show strong performance.
Table 3 and 4 that show how the dividend
decreases can bring positive market reac-
tions, confirm this result. The clarificatory
signals that have decreasing number of
dividend and carrying good news is also
significant at 0.032 and 0.021 levels. In
hypotheses-2 it is significant at the 0.078
and 0.047 levels.
This finding is also consistent with
Elfakhani’s (1995) as well as Swaminathan
and Weintrop (1991), which also showed
that dividend decreases could still import
significant positive market reactions. It
can be consistent only if there is other
corporate good news revealed through the
firm’s performance on the balance sheet
items. Most of the samples included in the
portfolio of clarificatory signals with de-
crease dividend have an increasing num-
ber in investment.
The flat or stable dividend in fact can
bring negative reactions. It is shown in
Table 3 and Table 4 on Panel A that totally
the stable dividend results in negative
market reactions. In Panel C, it is sepa-
rated between the stable clarificatory divi-
dends that bring bad news and good news.
Both news could bring negative market
reactions although both of them show posi-
tive and negative number of average ab-
normal returns significantly (Panel C). It
is because from the magnitude, the nega-
tive reaction is bigger than the positive
one.
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Table 4. CAR results for Dividend Signal Hypothesis: The Clarificatory Signal Case
Hypothesis-3 examine the clarificatory signal conditioned on the sign of dividend
change and the information favorableness, individually and jointly. The numbers in
parentheses are p-values. The sample period is 1998-2000.
Pre-Announcement Announcement Post- Total
Hypotheses-3 (-4 to -1) (0 to +1) Announcement (-4 to +5)
(+2 to +5)
PANEL A
Clarificatory,+ 0.038940935 0.002175395 0.042554878 0.083671208
(0.144) (0.636) (0.091)** (0.011)*
Clarificatory,0 -0.004577925 -0.001544969 -0.001868886 -0.007991781
(0.135) (0.429) (0.079)** (0.012)*
Clarificatory,- -0.00191183 0.052705024 0.20283705 0.253630245
(0.802) (0.299) (0.032)* (0.021)*
PANEL B
Clarificatory, Good News 0.036901 0.024981 0.106593 0.168475
(0.132) (0.190) (0.025)* (0.002)*
Clarificatory, Bad News -0.03322 -0.03705 -0.05176 -0.12204
(0.579) (0.522) (0.273) (0.093)**
PANEL C
Clarificatory,+, Good News 0.057028 0.013226 0.067252 0.137506
(0.056)** (0.019)* (0.083)** (0.001)*
Clarificatory,+, Bad News -0.03793 -0.04479 -0.06241 -0.14513
(0.616) (0.537) (0.285) (0.108)
Clarificatory,0, Good News 0.005256 0.003018 0.005433 0.013707
(0.011)* (0.009)** (0.006)** (0.000)*
Clarificatory,0, Bad News -0.01441 -0.00611 -0.00917 -0.02969
(0.033)* (0.241) (0.006)** (0.000)*
Clarificatory,-, Good News -0.00191183 0.052705024 0.20283705 0.253630245
(0.802) (0.299) (0.032)* (0.025)*
Clarificatory,-, Bad News ~ ~ ~ ~
~ ~ ~ ~
* Significant at .05 level; ** Significant at .10 level.  Panel B and C indicate that clarificatory signals
are conditioned on the signed of dividend change and the information favorableness.
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This finding indicates that stable divi-
dend Does not always bring positive reac-
tion. It is still influenced by firm’s perfor-
mance showed in the balance sheet. When
the news from the financial statement gives
a bad indicator then it is possible that the
market will react negatively although the
dividend remain stable. It reveals that the
financial statement released by firm could
give significant contribution to the market
reaction toward dividend announcement.
Conclusion
Integrating the information content
in the balance sheet and dividend give
significant signaling effect in the market
reaction. This paper reveals that the classi-
fication of dividend signal into three com-
ponents could improve the understanding
of the firm’s value. The result from this
paper shows that when the level of cer-
tainty towards the firm’s performance be-
fore the dividend announcement, which
can be reached through firm’s information
sources such as balance sheet, is high, then
the clarifying role become minimal. In this
circumstance, information contents in divi-
dend become less efficient and has little
value to the market. On the contrary, when
the market knows are less, then the more
efficient the dividend’s clarifying role in
the market reaction. In this condition, the
market becomes eager to receive the
clarificatory signal and to assess its con-
tents as carrying good or bad news. This
finding is consistent with those of previ-
ous research.
Thus, clarificatory signals bring
strong positive or negative market reac-
tion to good or bad news rather than the
confirmatory and unclear signals, which
provoke lesser market movements. The
finding also shows that in Indonesian case,
dividend signals that send good news cause
larger price movements rather than bad
news. It means the bad news carried by the
dividend may bring little information.
Another finding shows that the market
reactions depend more on the expected
content favorableness than on the sign of
dividend change. This fact is showed that
not all dividend decreases bring bad news.
It could be due to the sampling problem as
well as market condition. The minor in-
consistency with the theory provide po-
tential research topic in the future.
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